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Law Is Not Enough
NEIL S. SIEGEL*
Thank you, Dean Crago, for that generous introduction.
Please allow me to begin by thanking Professor Joanne Brant and the
Ohio Northern University Pettit College of Law for inviting me to deliver this
year’s Carhart Lecture. I am honored to be here and to contribute to all of the
good work that the Fred Carhart Memorial Program in Legal Ethics has been
doing since its inception eleven years ago.
I apologize for having had to reschedule this lecture not once but twice.
I am truly sorry. The first time was due to a family emergency, and the second
time was due to my work in the Senate on the U.S. Supreme Court
confirmation process of Justice Brett Kavanaugh. Now that this process is
complete, I am free to speak my mind—and to speak for myself alone.
I think it is fair to say that there is a widespread (albeit far from universal)
sense among legal academics, political scientists, members of the mainstream
news media, political elites, and politically engaged citizens who are not
elites that elected officials are crossing lines that should not be crossed and
are doing it a lot.1 What is more, there is a widespread (although, again, not
universally held) fear that the repeated crossing of such lines by politicians is
endangering the health—and perhaps the future viability—of constitutional
*
David W. Ichel Professor, Duke Law School. For helpful comments, I thank my colleagues Curtis
Bradley and H. Jefferson Powell.
1. See, e.g., Josh Chafetz & David E. Pozen, How Constitutional Norms Break Down, 65 UCLA
L. REV. 1430, 1432 (2018) (“From the moment Donald Trump was elected President, critics have
anguished over a breakdown in constitutional norms. Commentators of all stripes agree that ‘Trump’s
flouting of norms . . . has become a defining feature of his presidency,’ perhaps even its ‘most
consequential aspect.’ New watchdog groups and media projects have been established to highlight the
importance of unwritten rules and conventions for democratic governance, and to monitor breaches.”)
(footnotes omitted).
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democracy in the United States.2 At the same time, Americans who harbor
such concerns may find it difficult to explain where the lines are or even that
there are lines to begin with. Still, they worry about, for example, all of the
lying; the misuse of public office for private gain; the acts of extreme
partisanship; the lack of cooperation across party lines to address pressing
problems like climate change, immigration, and health care; and the attempts
not just to criticize but to delegitimize the political opposition, the news
media, the courts, and such nonpartisan institutions as the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the national security establishment, and the Congressional
Budget Office, whose job it is to leverage their expertise in order to serve the
American people.3
You may suspect that I am gently—or, perhaps, not so gently—referring
to much of the behavior of President Donald J. Trump since he entered
political life. There is no doubt that his conduct has raised serious concerns
among Americans on both sides of the political aisle, although his behavior
has raised greater concerns on one side—unfortunately, in my view. But
President Trump may be at least as much symptom as cause of a deeper
problem given the steadier, subtler, and longer-term deterioration of selfrestraint among members of other political institutions, including state
legislatures and the United States Congress.4 For example, during the
Kavanaugh confirmation process, the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary
Committee rejected past practice by declining to pursue a bipartisan
agreement with the Ranking Member on a document production process that
would be run by the nonpartisan National Archives.5 That was a first. Nor
did the Chairman proceed in a bipartisan fashion in responding to allegations
that the nominee had engaged in sexual misconduct and was being untruthful
about his past behavior.6
So what are worried Americans doing in the current situation? When
they express concerns, some institution-minded elected officials, legal
scholars, and political scientists talk (among other things) about the
2. See generally, e.g., TOM GINSBURG & AZIZ Z. HUQ, HOW TO SAVE A CONSTITUTIONAL
DEMOCRACY (2019); STEVEN LEVITSKY & DANIEL ZIBLATT, HOW DEMOCRACIES DIE (2018).
3. See generally, e.g., Neil S. Siegel, Political Norms, Constitutional Conventions, and President
Donald Trump, 93 IND. L.J. 177 (2018).
4. See generally, e.g., Chafetz & Pozen, supra note 1 (so arguing).
5. See, e.g., Jordain Carney, National Archives Distances Itself from Bush Team on Kavanaugh
Documents, THE HILL (Aug. 15, 2018), https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/402061-national-archivesdistances-itself-from-bush-team-on-kavanaugh-documents.
6. See, e.g., Jordain Carney, Grassley Panel Scraps Kavanaugh Hearing, Warns Committee Will
Vote Without Deal, THE HILL (Sept. 21, 2018), https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/407866-senate-panelscraps-kavanaugh-hearing-set-for-monday.
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importance of such ideas as norms, conventions, traditions, culture, historical
governmental practices, political precedent, and role morality.7 To be sure,
those concepts do not all point to precisely the same phenomena—for
example, historical practice tends to refer to a long-term accretion of
governmental conduct, whereas political precedent can refer to a specific past
decision or event.8 But at this moment in political time, I think it is more
important to be a lumper than a splitter—to explain what these ideas have in
common, what insight they reflect, and why many Americans reach for them
now. I will therefore use one umbrella term to refer to this cluster of related
ideas: I will call them norms.
The title of my lecture today identifies why I think many Americans reach
for norms now. It is because they understand that law is not enough to sustain
the American constitutional project. Why is law not enough? Because the
vitally important purposes that Americans ascribe to the U.S. Constitution
require more than legal fidelity for their vindication. I will therefore refer to
these related ideas not only as norms, but as constitutional norms. They are
constitutional in the sense that they are closely tied to the purposes, or spirit,
of the Constitution. They are constitutional in the sense that it would be
anticonstitutional for government officials to violate them—not in the sense
that it would be unconstitutional for officials to violate them.
***
Consider, for example, the primary reason that the young United States
moved from the Articles of Confederation to the Constitution: to create a
more effective, reasonably well-functioning federal government. This
purpose is reflected in much of the preratification history.9 It is also reflected
in the long list of legislative powers to act directly over individuals that the
Constitution gave to Congress in Article I, Section 8. It is further reflected in
7. See generally, e.g., E. J. DIONNE JR., NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, & THOMAS E. MANN, ONE NATION
AFTER TRUMP: A GUIDE FOR THE PERPLEXED, THE DISILLUSIONED, THE DESPERATE, AND THE NOT-YET
DEPORTED (2017); THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, IT’S EVEN WORSE THAN IT LOOKS: HOW
THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED WITH THE NEW POLITICS OF EXTREMISM (2nd ed.
2016); Neil S. Siegel, After the Trump Era: A Constitutional Role Morality for Presidents and Members
of Congress, 107 GEORGETOWN L.J. 109 (2018); LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra note 2; Siegel, supra note
3; Chafetz & Pozen, supra note 1; Thomas B. Edsall, Democracy Can Plant the Seeds of Its Own
Destruction, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/19/opinion/democracypopulism-trump.html [https://perma.cc/4SGX-ZP8M].
8. See Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Historical Gloss, Constitutional Conventions, and the
Judicial Separation of Powers, 105 GEORGETOWN L.J. 255, 263 (2017) (distinguishing historical practice
from political precedent).
9. For a recent, detailed account, see generally GEORGE WILLIAM VAN CLEVE, WE HAVE NOT A
GOVERNMENT: THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION AND THE ROAD TO THE CONSTITUTION (2017).
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Article II, which created an independent executive, and Article III, which
created an independent judiciary, both of which would be empowered to
enforce federal law. The national government under the Articles of
Confederation lacked these powers and institutions.
A potential obstacle to realizing this purpose, however, is that the
Constitution brought into being a robust system of separation of powers and
checks and balances. The constitutional text confers upon each branch
powers that, if taken to their lawful extreme, would cause the federal
government to cease to function. There are good reasons for this
arrangement—namely, the inability of the Framers to anticipate all of the
possible emergencies that might arise: the “various crises of human affairs,”
to (not) coin a phrase.10 This inability to predict the future causes constitution
writers to write a constitution that (they hope) can preserve the needed
flexibility to deal with any-and-all crises by giving coordinate branches
strong offensive and defensive powers. The cost of such an arrangement,
however, is the potential for ceaseless obstruction and gridlock in non-crisis
situations.
The problem is worse than that. The Framers of 1787 created a robust
separation of powers regime without anticipating political parties, let alone
the ideological parties in existence today but absent throughout most of the
twentieth century. This regime of separation of powers, which is often
characterized by the separation of parties in control of different parts of the
federal government,11 creates ample opportunities for one political party, or
a part of one party, to thwart potential action by the federal government.
Moreover, because the minority party in the Senate is empowered to filibuster
most legislation (at least for the time being), the problem of potential
paralysis endures in circumstances of unified government.
As a result, troubling questions arise regarding how the federal
government is to execute its basic responsibilities of: (1) filling executive and
judicial offices; (2) solving problems that the states are not well-situated to
10. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819) (“This provision is made in
a Constitution intended to endure for ages to come, and consequently to be adapted to the various crises
of human affairs. To have prescribed the means by which Government should, in all future time, execute
its powers would have been to change entirely the character of the instrument and give it the properties of
a legal code. It would have been an unwise attempt to provide by immutable rules for exigencies which,
if foreseen at all, must have been seen dimly, and which can be best provided for as they occur. To have
declared that the best means shall not be used, but those alone without which the power given would be
nugatory, would have been to deprive the legislature of the capacity to avail itself of experience, to exercise
its reason, and to accommodate its legislation to circumstances.”).
11. See generally Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119
HARV. L. REV. 2311 (2006).
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address on their own (characteristically, multi-state collective action
problems),12 and (3) safeguarding rights through the passage and updating of
civil rights legislation, which several constitutional provisions authorize
Congress to do.13 The separation and interrelation of powers are supposed to
cabin and qualify the exercise of the substantial set of powers that the
Constitution vests in the federal government. The separation is not supposed
to largely negate or neuter those powers.
Commentators who reject this understanding of the limited role of the
separation of powers in the constitutional scheme will likely reject much of
the analysis that I am offering for your consideration today. Although fully
defending the structural vision emphasized here would take this lecture too
far afield, I can efficiently deliver two points that support it. One is
originalist, and the other is living constitutionalist.
First, as I have already noted, the Framers of 1787 gathered in
Philadelphia to substantially enhance federal power, not to restrict it.14 One
often encounters heated rhetoric about a federal leviathan, and it is no doubt
true that the federal government today exercises powers that even the most
nationalist of our nation’s Founders would not have anticipated. But it bears
emphasizing that the perceived problem in the 1780s was that the national
government under the Articles of Confederation was way too weak, not that
it was so strong that a complex institutional architecture was needed to
restrain it.
Second, and arguably more importantly, most Americans living today
look to the federal government to actually exercise its powers in a variety of
ways, not to be consistently hamstrung in its ability to do so. There comes a
point at which the “checks and balances” theory of the horizontal
constitutional structure malfunctions; rather than acting to discourage illconsidered or excessive federal action, all the checking and balancing
produce hopeless gridlock and obstructionism.
12. For work developing and applying the theory of collective action federalism, see generally
Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General Theory of Article I, Section
8, 63 STAN. L. REV. 115 (2010) [hereinafter Cooter & Siegel, Collective Action Federalism]; Neil S.
Siegel, Free Riding on Benevolence: Collective Action Federalism and the Minimum Coverage Provision,
75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 29 (2012) (no. 3); Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism and Its
Discontents, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1937 (2013) [hereinafter Siegel, Collective Action Federalism and Its
Discontents].
13. The structural logic of the federal government’s role in protecting civil rights is distinct from
the logic of collective action. See Siegel, Collective Action Federalism and Its Discontents, supra note 12,
at 1948 (“[T]he enforcement clauses [of the Civil War Amendments] give Congress authority to regulate
the internal policy choices of state governments concerning certain subject matters regardless of collective
action problems facing the states.”) (footnotes omitted).
14. See, e.g., Cooter & Siegel, Collective Action Federalism, supra note 12, at 117, 121–24.
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One obvious response is to invoke the vertical constitutional structure—
that is, federalism. On this view, it is a good thing (or at least not a bad thing)
if the federal government is incapable of taking effective action; the states
can often act effectively, and federal inaction leaves the states more room to
maneuver. This position, however, neglects the basic insight of collective
action federalism, which I have developed elsewhere.15
There are many problems in today’s modern, integrated economy and
society whose nature and scope disrespect state borders, so that the states
actually need the federal government to be able to step in. Examples include
military defense, anti-terrorism efforts, interstate markets, interstate
infrastructure, and environmental protection.16 Where collective action by
states is required in order for substantial progress to be made, having a strong,
effective federal government promotes rather than undermines state
autonomy. Accordingly, if one examines the entire American constitutional
structure—not just the horizontal separation and interrelation of powers at the
federal level, but also the vertical separation of powers between the federal
government and the states—the sounder conclusion is that all Americans, as
well as state governments themselves, are better served as a general matter
by a federal government that can act, and act effectively. The recent
government shutdown, the longest in our nation’s history, underscored the
extent to which modern Americans rely upon the effective exercise of federal
power.
There is another reason why the separation of powers and parties may at
first glance seem like only a feature and never a bug. Creating an effective
federal government is not the only purpose of the Constitution. It is also
important to ensure that due regard will be given to the interests and
commitments of members of the political party out of power. This is
necessary to achieve another purpose of the Constitution: realizing the
American conception of democracy as collective self-governance. In such a
heterogeneous, and now polarized, national political community, how can
Americans whose party loses the most recent election or two avoid alienation
from the federal government? Reconciling democracy and diversity requires
not only members of the majority party, but also members of the minority
party, to regard themselves as self-governing in some real sense.17 One way
to try to reconcile the purposes of sustaining both effective federal
governance and collective self-governance is to impose institutional means
15. For work on the theory of collective action federalism, see supra note 12.
16. See generally, e.g., Cooter & Siegel, supra note 12 (discussing those examples).
17. For a discussion, see Siegel, supra note 7, at 127-37.
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of forcing consensus, and requiring multiple branches and parties to approve
governmental actions can serve this function. For example, the filibuster as
to appointments or legislation will promote bipartisanship when both the
majority and the minority party participate in the political process with
restraint. This means that the majority party avoids giving the minority party
reason to filibuster bills routinely and the minority party uses the filibuster
sparingly.
The difficulty, as I have emphasized, is that the political branches are also
charged with accomplishing various tasks associated with governance, from
appointing officials to enacting legislation. And the separation of powers and
parties can result in Congress accomplishing little when the parties lack
moderation, which has arguably been the case at the federal level too often in
recent years. For example, whatever one’s preferred solution to the problem
of more than eleven million undocumented people living, to a significant
extent, in the shadows in the United States, the federal government should
also be addressing the issue through new legislation, not just through
unilateral action by the president (whether Obama or Trump).
To be sure, a number of heated political disagreements in America today
are, in part, precisely about how much action the federal government should
be taking. It is worth repeating, however, that Americans of most ideological
stripes want the federal government to be able to act effectively, even if they
sometimes disagree about the spheres or directions in which such effective
action should take place.18 (Demands for a robust federal response to the
latest natural disaster continuously bring this point home.) The federal
government cannot function effectively, however, if presidents and the
majority and minority parties in Congress lack forbearance—that is, if they
push to the legal limits their powers to, for example, nominate aggressive
partisans, decline to nominate people to fill key positions, repeatedly make
use of the filibuster, and deny confirmation hearings or votes (or not consider
nominees at all).
Consider, for example, the Senate’s handling of judicial nominations in
recent years. To put the point gently, the Senate has increasingly become
dysfunctional. More often than not, Senators are unable to cooperate across
party lines in order to execute the basic responsibilities of the federal
government in the constitutional scheme. For example, a Democratic Senate
ended the filibuster for lower federal court nominees in 2013 after alleging
18. See generally, e.g., Neil S. Siegel, None of the Law but One, 62 DRAKE L. REV. 1055 (2014)
(collecting numerous examples of ways in which today’s congressional Republicans, like congressional
Democrats, possess and seek to leverage a broad view of the constitutional scope of federal power).
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unprecedented Republican obstruction.19 A Republican Senate did the same
for Supreme Court nominees in 2017 in order to overcome a Democratic
filibuster of Republican nominee Neil Gorsuch.20 Senate Republicans so
acted after holding Justice Antonin Scalia’s seat open for roughly a year in
order to prevent Democratic President Barack Obama from filling the
vacancy by appointing Chief Judge Merrick Garland of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.21 Most recently, as I noted at the outset, Senate
Republicans cast aside the previous practice of reaching bipartisan agreement
on a document production process that is run by the nonpartisan National
Archives, and then responded unilaterally to allegations that the nominee had
engaged in sexual misconduct decades earlier.22 It remains to be seen whether
it will again be possible to fill a vacancy on the Supreme Court when the same
political party does not control both the White House and the Senate.
Because the Supreme Court is not like other courts, it is a problem if we
are nearing (or have arrived at) the point at which Supreme Court vacancies
will go unfilled unless the same political party controls both the White House
and the Senate. The Supreme Court plays a unique role in ensuring
uniformity on important questions of federal law, and an even number of
justices on a closely divided Court impairs its ability to execute this
responsibility. The Court ends up granting fewer cases, splitting 4-4 on some
of the cases it does agree to hear (thereby not establishing a precedent), and
deciding some cases very narrowly (thereby offering little guidance) in order
to avoid such splits.23 Moreover, judges from other courts cannot sit by
designation in order to break ties, nor could visiting judges provide the kind
of guidance and stability that the legal system often requires.
This example illustrates the importance of constitutional norms—of
normative constraints on elected officials over and above strictly legal limits
that oblige them to participate in the political process with some self-restraint,
and so to refrain from pushing their legal powers to their respective maxima.
19. See Jeremy W. Peters, In Landmark Vote, Senate Limits Use of the Filibuster, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 21, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/22/us/politics/reid-sets-in-motion-steps-to-limit-useof-filibuster.html.
20. See Matt Flegenheimer, Senate Republicans Deploy “Nuclear Option” to Clear Path for
Gorsuch, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/06/us/politics/neil-gorsuchsupreme-court-senate.html?_r=0.
21. See Mike DeBonis, Judge Dashes Merrick Garland’s Final, Faint Hope for a Supreme Court
Seat, WASH. POST (Nov. 18, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2016/11/18/
judge-dashes-merrick-garlands-final-faint-hope-for-a-supreme-court-seat/?utm_term=.b518d565f272.
22. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
23. For a discussion, see Neil S. Siegel, The Harm in the GOP’s Pseudo-Principled Supreme Court
Stance, THE HILL (Apr. 15, 2016), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/the-judiciary/276462-the-harmsin-being-pseudo-principled-about-the-supreme-court.
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In the past, it was norms that both preserved the filibuster with respect to
judicial nominations and limited its use. As the English Whig and Liberal
politician, (and future prime minister) Lord Jon Russell wrote to Poulett
Thomson in 1839 while the latter was Governor General of Canada, “[e]very
political constitution in which different bodies share the supreme power is
only enabled to exist by the forbearance of those among whom this power is
distributed. . . . Each must exercise a wise moderation.”24
Representatives disserve everyone, including Americans who voted for
them, when they undermine the proper functioning of the constitutional
system. Relevant in this regard is the political science literature suggesting
that today’s elected officials are disserving their constituents (including the
people who voted for them) by pursuing policies that are more extreme than
what their constituents would want.25
A key role of constitutional norms is to keep partisanship within
reasonable bounds so that the federal government can function more
effectively and with greater stability—so that there is more bipartisan action
by the federal government, as opposed to opposition-forced inaction or
narrowly partisan action (often accompanied by a disreputable process) in
order to overcome the opposition.26 Constitutional norms, while not in the
Constitution, are properly called constitutional because they are deeply
connected to the Constitution. And they are deeply connected to the
Constitution because, to repeat the basic takeaway of my lecture, law alone
is not enough to sustain the American constitutional project.
Similar stories could be told about the role of constitutional norms in
sustaining other purposes of the Constitution. Those purposes include, as I
have already mentioned, realizing the American conception of democracy as
collective self-governance, which (to reiterate) can be in tension with the
purpose of sustaining an effective federal government because collective selfgovernance requires members of the minority party to retain some influence
over governmental decision making.27 These purposes also include
combatting the misuse of public office for private gain (otherwise known as
24. Letter of Lord John Russell to Poulett Thomson (October 14, 1839), available at
http://www.constitution.org/sech/sech_133.txt. This quote appears in WOODROW WILSON,
CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT 165 (1885). I thank Peter Shane for these references. See also Edmund
Burke, An Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs, in 4 THE WORKS OF THE RIGHT HONORABLE EDMUND
BURKE 208 (1889) (“[I]n the British constitution, there is a perpetual treaty and compromise going on.”).
25. See, e.g., Jeffrey R. Lax & Justin H. Phillips, The Democratic Deficit in the States, 56 AM. J.
POL. SCI. 148, 149 (2011) (finding, inter alia, that “state policy is far more polarized than public
preferences”).
26. Siegel, supra note 3, at 188.
27. For a discussion, see Siegel, supra note 7, at 127-37.
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corruption),28 preventing the politicization of federal criminal law
enforcement,29 and protecting a significant measure of judicial
independence.30
***
American constitutional law scholars appreciate the idea that law is not
enough to restrain government officials when those officials are federal
judges. Scholars understand that law narrowly conceived does not suffice to
render the fact of judicial discretion compatible with the limited place of
judges in the constitutional scheme. And so constitutional law scholars push
ideas like the counter-majoritarian difficulty, judicial restraint, reason giving,
the virtue of consistency in judicial decision making, the “modalities” of
constitutional interpretation, the perception and reality of judicial
impartiality, and the importance of judicial statesmanship—of taking some
account of the conditions of the public legitimacy of the decisions that judges
render.31 Different scholars disagree—both at a particular time and over
time—about how judges should fulfill their institutional role.32 But they
continue to push constraining ideas upon judges that sound more in norms
than law. For example, constitutional law scholars do not assert that it would
be illegal, akin to taking a bribe, for a judge to consider policy consequences
in adjudicating a constitutional case. They instead insist that it is contrary to
judicial role for judges to decide cases just in light of their policy preferences.
When the conversation turns to elected officials, however, constitutional
law scholars typically embrace the distinction that Herbert Wechsler
articulated in his famous “neutral principles” article—between law as a
system of “hard” limits on the exercise of political discretion and politics as
a realm of unlimited discretion.33 When politicians push their powers to the
28. For a discussion, see generally ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA: FROM
BENJAMIN FRANKLIN’S SNUFF BOX TO CITIZENS UNITED (2014).
29. For a discussion, see Siegel, supra note 3, at 198-200.
30. For a discussion, see generally Bradley & Siegel, supra note 8.
31. For a discussion and citations to the literature, see Siegel, supra note 7, at 119-20 & n.43.
32. See Craig Green, What Does Richard Posner Know About How Judges Think?, 98 CAL. L.
REV. 625, 661 (2010) (reviewing RICHARD POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK (2008)) (“Conversations about
judicial role do not yield an image of cultural consensus, much less of unanimity. Our variegated legal
community is populated by judges, lawyers, and commentators who differ widely over how judges do and
should act.”).
33. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1,
15 (1959) (“[W]hether you are tolerant, perhaps more tolerant than I, of the ad hoc in politics, with
principle reduced to a manipulative tool, are you not also ready to agree that something else is called for
from the courts? I put it to you that the main constituent of the judicial process is precisely that it must be
genuinely principled, resting with respect to every step that is involved in reaching judgment on analysis
and reasons quite transcending the immediate result that is achieved.”).
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legal limit in order to secure partisan advantage, constitutional law scholarsqua-scholars tend to just shrug and mutter that the Constitution has nothing
to do with the matter.
I suggest to you that this view is incorrect. Constitutional norms occupy
the normative territory at the border between law and politics as typically
conceived. They help accomplish key constitutional purposes, even if they
are not strictly legal in status. To be sure, constitutional norms can become
outdated and change over time, as law and politics themselves change over
time. And sometimes the stakes of politics are so high that politicians are
justified in disregarding particular norms.34 But the system cannot survive
claims of continuous, across the board, emergency with respect to almost
every issue. If certain norms have long been viewed as playing vital roles,
then politicians should have good, public-regarding reasons for disregarding
them. The fact that norms are in the way is not such a reason; norms are
supposed to be in the way.
***
If one fully appreciates the role that constitutional norms play in
sustaining the constitutional system, one may have mixed feelings when
commentators advise politicians on “their side” to defy such norms in
response to norm violations by the “other side.” On one hand, this approach
will likely continue fueling a race to the normative bottom. For example,
Professors Mark Tushnet, Michael Klarman, and a few others have been
urging Democrats to seriously consider adding two or more seats to the
Supreme Court when they again control both the Presidency and the Senate,
whether to counteract the asserted illegitimacy of President Trump’s
election,35 or to take back the seat that Republicans allegedly “stole” from
34. The great classics of political role morality tend to emphasize the high stakes of politics in
contrast to ordinary private moral life. See NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE (Tim Parks trans. 2009)
(1532); Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 77-128 (Hans
H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills trans. & eds., 1946) (1919); Michael Walzer, The Problem of Dirty Hands, 2
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 160 (1973); Thomas Nagel, Ruthlessness in Public Life, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
MORALITY 75–91 (Stuart Hampshire ed., 1978). While this view can easily be overstated or misused to
rationalize troubling behavior by politicians, there is no doubt truth to the conviction that sometimes the
stakes are so high in politics that even venerable norms must give way.
35. See Michael Klarman, Why Democrats Should Pack the Supreme Court, TAKE CARE (Oct. 15,
2018), https://takecareblog.com/blog/why-democrats-should-pack-the-supreme-court (“A president who
lost the popular election by 2.9 million votes—and whose victory was rendered possible only by an FBI
director’s misguided intervention, Russian meddling in the election (which, at a minimum, the victorious
candidate’s campaign team attempted to involve itself with), and the candidate’s own personal
involvement in a felonious scheme to pay hush money to an adult film actress days before the election to
cover up an extramarital affair—ought not to be making Supreme Court appointments that will continue
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them when they refused to consider Chief Judge Garland and ultimately
appointed Justice Gorsuch.36 (Note that adding and filling one seat would
merely neutralize the influence of Justice Gorsuch; adding and filling two
seats would be required to simulate the impact of having confirmed Chief
Judge Garland as an initial matter.) Such suggestions may trouble even some
Americans who were deeply troubled by the circumstances of Trump’s
election and the Republicans’ refusal to consider Chief Judge Garland,
although calls for Court-packing may increase in the years ahead given the
divisiveness of the Kavanaugh confirmation process, and given that the Court
over at least the next decade is likely to be substantially more conservative
than a majority of the national population.
On the other hand, one need not have studied much game theory to
understand that Professors Tushnet and Klarman make an important point:
unilateral disarmament is not a wise option if one is interested in protecting
one’s interests and values, as well as ensuring norm compliance over the
longer term. In my view, unilateral disarmament is just being a sucker
without in any event changing the nature of the race being played. I therefore
do not believe that the way to sustain constitutional norms is to comply with
them no matter what the political opposition does—to always model ideal
institutional behavior.
What, then, should a constitutionally conscientious politician or scholar
do if she realizes the nature of the race being played and does not want to be
a sucker (or advise others to be suckers), but would also like to promote a
different sort of race—a race to the top? This is an extraordinarily difficult
question to answer, and I do not pretend to have solutions. I will, however,
offer five modest suggestions.
First, as I just suggested, I would advise against unilateral disarmament.
The two political parties should follow a tit-for-tat strategy where the issue
matters (such as in the area of judicial appointments), but they should also
make clear why they are doing so and why a different course would be
preferable for all involved. For example, if the Democrats had won control
of the Senate in 2016, they might have announced that they would confirm
only Merrick Garland or someone ideologically similar as a first appointment.

to affect the country for the next thirty-plus years. Democrats must seize the earliest opportunity to offset
those appointments with some of their own.”).
36. See Mark Tushnet, Expanding the Judiciary, the Senate Rules, and the Small-c Constitution,
BALKINIZATION (Nov. 25, 2017), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2017/11/expanding-judiciary-senate-rulesand.html (“I think – really, I do think this – that Democrats should be thinking about the possibility of
expanding the Court’s size to 11 as soon as they get the chance (if they ever do).”).
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If so, I would hope that they would also have come to the decision with some
regret and with a public expression of hope for a different path in the future.
I do not expect the other party to be satisfied by such a posture. The other
party is likely to believe that the interaction started earlier—that the other side
“started it.” In the case of judicial nominations, for example, Republicans are
likely to cite the Democratic Senate’s rejection of Judge Robert Bork for the
Supreme Court in 1987 or the Democrats’ termination of the filibuster as to
lower federal court nominees in 2013. There are responses to these claims,
but in this lecture I do not wish to adjudicate the disagreement between the
parties about “who started it” any more than I like adjudicating such disputes
between my daughters; indeed, I fear the country is so polarized that any such
attempt would itself seem partisan.37 Rather, my point is that there may be
an important difference between a politician who exults in partisan combat
and one who regrets participating in a race to the bottom. There may be no
hope for a different future if we are dealing only with partisan warriors; there
may be some reason for cautious optimism if we are dealing with a critical
mass of reluctant combatants.
Second, I would advise both political parties to be mindful of the
difference between tit-for-tat and conflict escalation. For example, there is at
least a plausible argument that Court-packing proposals like Professor
Tushnet’s and Professor Klarman’s would escalate a conflict and not simply
amount to responding in kind, at least to the extent those proposals were
aimed at counteracting the Senate’s refusal to consider Chief judge Garland.38
Once Court-packing is on the table (after being off the table since at least
1869 and being rejected in part on normative grounds by Democrats in 1937
when a popular Democratic president proposed it),39 so is more Courtpacking and then Court-unpacking.
One can no doubt question the usefulness of the distinction between titfor-tat and conflict escalation, given that what one side views as tit-for-tat the
other side may be likely to interpret as escalation. Even so, the distinction is
defensible in principle and is applied in practice in a variety of settings.
Consider, for example, the distinction in foreign policy circles between
economic sanctions and military intervention, and the more general
37. See Mark Tushnet, The Pirate’s Code: Constitutional Conventions in the United States, 45
PEPPERDINE L. Rev. 481, 485-86 (2018) (recording this observation).
38. Responding to President Trump’s election may be a different matter. If the evidence ultimately
supports the claim that Trump was not legitimately elected (an issue on which I take no view here), there
may be no way other than adding seats to the Supreme Court to undo the impact of his appointments,
which presumably will last for decades.
39. For a historical analysis of Court-packing in the United States that focuses on President
Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s failed attempt in 1937, see Bradley & Siegel, supra note 8, at 269-87.
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requirement in international law that a nation’s responses to a breach of norms
by another state be “proportional.”40 Moreover, there may be a difference
between how politicians characterize the other side’s behavior in public and
what they understand to be going on in private.
Third, I would encourage both parties to consider ways of establishing a
different race through a series of incremental, confidence-building measures
and compromises (a very difficult task given political-base opposition to
compromise). Going back to the hypothetical in which the Democrats had
regained control of the Senate in 2016, they could have insisted that Chief
Judge Garland be confirmed, but they also could have publicly committed to
considering in good faith future Trump nominees to fill future vacancies once
Garland was confirmed.
Fourth, I would advise members of both parties to try to engage
thoughtful, patriotic citizens of the opposing party or ideology in this
Constitution-sustaining work. Respect for constitutional norms requires
respect for the legitimacy of the political opposition.41 I realize how naïve
this may sound in the current political moment, which has veered into Game
of Thrones territory: politicians who are assiduous about respecting norms
are likely to get their proverbial heads chopped off. But I do not think it is
foolish to hope and expect that constitutional norms will play a greater role
at a future time, especially if President Trump is denied re-election at least in
part because of his prominence in the anticanon of politicians who respect
constitutional norms.
As far as I can discern as I endeavor to be objective (as opposed to
neutral), the primary impediment to getting to the point at which politicians
respect constitutional norms to a substantially greater extent than they do now
may be the somewhat asymmetric nature of current partisanship in the United
States: more Republicans view Democrats as fundamentally illegitimate
today than the other way around. I say this for a number of reasons,
including: (1) the political science literature on polarization, which finds that
Republicans have moved further to the right over the past several decades
than Democrats have moved to the left;42 (2) the Republicans’ treatment of
Chief Judge Garland after Democrats had accepted the basic legitimacy of
40. See generally Thomas M. Franck, On Proportionality of Countermeasures in International
Law, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 715 (2008) (finding that the principle of proportionality succeeds in limiting
conflict escalation between nations because frequent application of the principle has rendered it more
determinate).
41. See LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra note 2, at 8-9, 102-06; see also Siegel, supra note 7, at 15152.
42. See, e.g., Mann & Ornstein, supra note 7, at 51-58.
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Republican control of the Supreme Court since 1969;43 (3) the prominent
Republican Senators, including Ted Cruz, John McCain, and Richard Burr of
my home state, who vowed to hold Justice Scalia’s seat open for four years
in the event that Hillary Clinton won (as then seemed likely), in contrast to
Democratic Senators or candidates who said nothing similar about what they
would do if Donald Trump won;44 and (4) the 49% of Republicans—in
contrast to 33% of Democrats—who said in 2010 that they would be
“somewhat or very unhappy” if their child married someone of the other
political party.45
More fundamentally, I say this because there are reasons why the
Republican Party may be more vulnerable than the Democratic Party to the
temptations of hyper-partisanship. The GOP has become overwhelmingly
white and predominantly Christian, and white Christians are a once-dominant
majority in the United States whose numbers and cultural status are declining
as the country becomes racially and ethnically more diverse as well as more
secular.46 As political scientists Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt recently
observed in their book How Democracies Die, a once-dominant group whose
status is increasingly in question is likely to view the political opposition as
posing an existential threat to its continued existence and so as fundamentally
illegitimate.47 Consistent with this demographic and cultural interpretation
of contemporary American politics is the unfortunate reality that the
Republican Party today wants to make it harder to vote and the Democratic
43. See Richard Primus, Rulebooks, Playgrounds, and Endgames: A Constitutional Analysis of the
L.
REV.
BLOG
(Nov.
24,
2017),
Calabresi-Hirji
Judgeship
Proposal,
HARV.
https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/rulebooks-playgrounds-and-endgames-a-constitutional-analysis-ofthe-calabresi-hirji-judgeship-proposal/ (“Democratic-appointed judges are not to be considered a normal
part of the system, fit to exercise adjudicative authority because they too are honorable servants of the
Constitution, even if they understand the Constitution differently from the way we understand it. No. They
are to be regarded unfit per se.”).
44. Id. (“As 2016 wore on, Republican Senators from McConnell to Cruz to McCain said
publicly that if Hillary Clinton won the election, they wouldn’t consider any of her nominees to
the Supreme Court. If one takes what they said seriously—and I do, because it hangs together well
with the rest of the related conduct—they planned to use their blocking power to keep the Supreme
Court shorthanded indefinitely rather than let Democratic appointees become a majority, even if a
Democrat were to be elected President.”); LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra note 2, at 166 (“In the run-up
to the 2016 election, when it was widely believed that Hillary Clinton would win, several Republican
senators, including Ted Cruz, John McCain, and Richard Burr, vowed to block all of Clinton’s Supreme
Court nominations for the next four years, effectively reducing the Court’s size to eight.”).
45. See LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra note 2, at 167-68 (citing this statistic).
46. See generally, e.g., Neil S. Siegel, The Distinctive Role of Justice Samuel Alito: From a Politics
of Restoration to a Politics of Dissent, 126 YALE L.J. F. 164, 169 (2016) (observing that “the idea that
traditionalists will be able to ‘restor[e] the culture’ may become increasingly implausible even to them,”
and that “[t]heir politics of restoration of the culture will have evolved into a politics of dissent from the
culture”) (quoting the Liberty Counsel website).
47. LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra note 2, at 173-75.
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Party wants to make it easier—just as the Republican Party wants to reduce
immigration and the Democratic Party wants to increase it.
I hope that the political science literature is wrong about the asymmetric
nature of political polarization in the United States, because the problems we
face as a nation will be less severe if I am wrong.48 Even if I am right,
however, there are still a good number of members of each main political
party who respect members of the other party and who recognize their
common humanity and citizenship, even as they disagree with them
significantly on various issues. Our future as a successful constitutional
democracy may lie with them.
Fifth, and speaking now to legal scholars, political scientists, and
students, I would advise producing normative work that imagines a more
hopeful future, one in which presidents and members of Congress value
constitutional norms to a substantially greater extent than they do today.49
Our constitutional system depends upon fidelity to such norms. And with
apologies to The Last Jedi, without hope, I fear we are doomed.

48. For an argument that Republican politicians are, for various reasons, more likely to engage in
behavior that disrespects constitutional norms, see generally Joseph Fishkin & David E. Pozen,
Asymmetric Constitutional Hardball, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 915 (2018); See id. at 982 (“[T]he appeal of
flouting Washington norms is now very strong among Republican voters, and it takes no great publicopinion expertise to see that this appeal was central to the electoral success of President Trump.”); id. at
940 (surveying evidence suggesting that “Republican partisans are . . . strikingly more likely than
Democratic partisans to reject consensual politics in principle”).
49. For one attempt, see generally, Siegel, supra note 7.
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